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A recent tweet by Monkchips caught my eye; “good question from @tomraftery. regarding smartgrid resilience how will we defend against electro magnetic pulses?”.
Having recently written about smart grids the question of potential security risks is a good one in my view. I got to thinking that the question of whether the vendor spokespeople had anything scripted to say was interesting, and perhaps indicative in a small sample way of the lack of strategic risk analysis in the vendor community. But the really interesting question is the other one; are smart grids inherently more at risk from an EMP incident?

“Compared to what?” is the first response. Compared to the status quo of national and international grids powered by baseload and demand plants fueled mostly by fossil fuels? Compared to individual off-the-grid power generation by the likes of smal PV and wind based renewables? Smart grids and the status quo approaches rely on networked generation, so they both carry the added risk of a cascaded failure, where a failure in one part of the grid unbalances neighbouring zones. Individual power generation failures cannot cascade; all failures are local failures.

Meanwhile smart grids share the same generation methods and technologies that are used in individual off-the-grid generation. A mix of renewable generation techniques including PV, wind, wave, water, thermal tower and the like would be used, as suited to the local environmental conditions. Is such equipment especially vulnerable to EMP? If the vendors Monkchips spoke with are indicative it might be safe to say that EMP shielding is unlikely to be a current design feature on standard, commercially available installations. There is inherently more electronics distributed throughout a smart grid than in the status quo grid, therefore it is fair to say that on a component basis the equipment used in smart grids is damaged more easily by EMP.

In a smart grid, some of those electronic components will be involved in managing the flow of electricity across the grid; controlling and measuring consumption and contribution whilst maintaining a baseload current. So a failure due to EMP would not only knock out local generation in the affected area, it would also knockout the controlling grid management nodes. There is in this case the potential for cascade failure flowing out from the area directly affected by the pulse.

In reality however, the status quo grid is today national and international structure of both radial and interconnected design. Switches between network branches control the flow of electricity, dictated by spot market price fluctuations and efforts to balance the grid to baseload demands. Switch changes are made both manually and automatically. The existing danger of cascade failure was famously demonstrated in the 2003 failure of the grid in the North East of the USA. This article (http://www.newsmax.com/weyrich/emp_radiation/2008/06/25/107194.html) holds the view that the existing grid is already gravely at risk from cascade failure.

Arguably, smart grids might actually be more resilient than the existing switch grid networks in two important ways. Firstly, the modern equipment may detect an up or downstream fault faster, make a decision faster, then enact a switch change faster than current systems. The difference may only be milliseconds, however that may be the difference between cascade or otherwise. Secondly, smart grids are intended to have a more granular switching capability, though they will likely share the same suburban and rural trunk and backbone transmission as is already used today. “Lower” down the food chain from the suburb level subgrid might be street level controlling nodes and so on. The greater granularity of such control nodes may also isolate a cascade faikure within a smaller zone.

So far its a fairly even match. The generation nodes in smart grids and local off-the-grid designs is likely to be less EMP resilient than a coal fired power station. On the other hand both the smart grid and the status quo share a risk of cascade failure. The smart grid design may even be a little more resilient to cascade failure.

But there’s one more thing worth considering; that is the question of whether there is a material risk of an EMP incident anyway. An EMP incident isn’t something that is likely to occur everyday; the detonation of a nuclear weapon high in the atmosphere would do it. There are a few other ways, but all require nothing less than considerable money, skills, madness, and balls. A hostile EMP incident will either be an active of war launched by a nation state, or one of terrorism by an unallied group. There is also the possibility of friendly fire by way of an industrial accident, or the failure of one or another item of ill maintained national critical infrastructure (whether privately or publically managed).

If the EMP incident was as a result of friendly fire then it is highly unlikely that an atmospheric nuclear detonation would occur. If the attack was an act of terrorism then it is on the balance more likely that an EMP pulse could be generated locally to a generation plant or other critical element, and less likely that a nuclear bomb could be procured and exploded in an aeroplane or launched in a rocket to explode over the target company. Again, the affect would therefore be localised and unlikely to result in catastrophic cascade failure throughout the grid.

In the event that a nationwide EMP incident did occur, the country is probably at war. At that point all this discussion is perhaps interesting, but whether we have a smart grid or the status quo grid probably isn’t our biggest problem. Other than the fact of course that it is arguable that there will be more international conflict ahead of us if we continue the status quo approach, fuelled by resource shortages and social disruption resulting from the effects of climate change.